17946518. MEMORY DEVICE SECURITY AND ROW HAMMER MITIGATION simplified abstract (Micron Technology, Inc.)

MEMORY DEVICE SECURITY AND ROW HAMMER MITIGATION

Organization Name

Micron Technology, Inc.

Inventor(s)

Yang Lu of Boise ID (US)

Sujeet Ayyapureddi of Boise ID (US)

Edmund J. Gieske of Boise ID (US)

Cagdas Dirik of Indianola WA (US)

Ameen D. Akel of Rancho Cordova CA (US)

Elliott C. Cooper-balis of San Jose CA (US)

Amitava Majumdar of Boise ID (US)

Robert M. Walker of Raleigh NC (US)

Danilo Caraccio of Milano (IT)

MEMORY DEVICE SECURITY AND ROW HAMMER MITIGATION - A simplified explanation of the abstract

This abstract first appeared for US patent application 17946518 titled 'MEMORY DEVICE SECURITY AND ROW HAMMER MITIGATION

Simplified Explanation

The abstract describes a system for enhancing the security and reliability of memory devices by mitigating the effects of row hammer attacks. Row hammer is a vulnerability in dynamic random access memory (DRAM) that allows an attacker to manipulate data by rapidly accessing and deactivating specific rows of memory cells.

• The system includes a control mechanism implemented in the front-end and/or back-end of a memory sub-system.
• The control mechanism refreshes rows of memory to prevent row hammer attacks.
• A row activation command is received by the control circuitry, which increments a row counter stored in a content addressable memory (CAM).
• The control circuitry determines if the row counter exceeds a row hammer threshold (RHT) minus a counter for CAM decrease (CDC).
• The CDC is incremented each time the CAM is full.
• If the row counter exceeds the RHT minus the CDC, a refresh command is issued to the corresponding row address.

Potential applications of this technology:

• Memory devices in computers, servers, and other electronic devices can benefit from enhanced security and reliability.
• Cloud computing infrastructure can utilize this technology to protect against row hammer attacks and improve data integrity.
• Mobile devices, such as smartphones and tablets, can benefit from the mitigation of row hammer vulnerabilities.

Problems solved by this technology:

• Row hammer attacks can manipulate data and compromise the security and integrity of memory devices.
• Row hammer vulnerabilities can lead to system crashes, data corruption, and unauthorized access.
• Existing mitigation techniques may not be sufficient to prevent row hammer attacks.

Benefits of this technology:

• Enhanced security: By mitigating row hammer attacks, the system improves the security of memory devices and protects against unauthorized data manipulation.
• Improved reliability: Refreshing rows of memory reduces the likelihood of data corruption and system crashes caused by row hammer vulnerabilities.
• Compatibility: The control mechanism can be implemented in existing memory sub-systems without requiring significant hardware or software modifications.

Original Abstract Submitted

Systems, methods, and apparatus for memory device security and row hammer mitigation are described. A control mechanism may be implemented in a front-end and/or a back-end of a memory sub-system to refresh rows of the memory. A row activation command having a row address at control circuitry of a memory sub-system and incrementing a first count of a row counter corresponding to the row address stored in a content addressable memory (CAM) of the memory sub-system may be received. Control circuitry may determine whether the first count is greater than a row hammer threshold (RHT) minus a second count of a CAM decrease counter (CDC); the second count may be incremented each time the CAM is full. A refresh command to the row address may be issued when a determination is made that the first count is greater than the RHT minus the second count.