Microsoft technology licensing, llc (20240193264). FUSE BASED REPLAY PROTECTION WITH AGGRESSIVE FUSE USAGE AND COUNTERMEASURES FOR FUSE VOLTAGE CUT ATTACKS simplified abstract
Contents
- 1 FUSE BASED REPLAY PROTECTION WITH AGGRESSIVE FUSE USAGE AND COUNTERMEASURES FOR FUSE VOLTAGE CUT ATTACKS
- 1.1 Organization Name
- 1.2 Inventor(s)
- 1.3 FUSE BASED REPLAY PROTECTION WITH AGGRESSIVE FUSE USAGE AND COUNTERMEASURES FOR FUSE VOLTAGE CUT ATTACKS - A simplified explanation of the abstract
- 1.4 Simplified Explanation
- 1.5 Potential Applications
- 1.6 Problems Solved
- 1.7 Benefits
- 1.8 Commercial Applications
- 1.9 Prior Art
- 1.10 Frequently Updated Research
- 1.11 Questions about Secure Authentication Technology with Programmable Fuses
- 1.12 Original Abstract Submitted
FUSE BASED REPLAY PROTECTION WITH AGGRESSIVE FUSE USAGE AND COUNTERMEASURES FOR FUSE VOLTAGE CUT ATTACKS
Organization Name
microsoft technology licensing, llc
Inventor(s)
Ling Tony Chen of Bellevue WA (US)
Ankur Choudhary of Redmond WA (US)
Bradley Joseph Litterell of Bellevue WA (US)
FUSE BASED REPLAY PROTECTION WITH AGGRESSIVE FUSE USAGE AND COUNTERMEASURES FOR FUSE VOLTAGE CUT ATTACKS - A simplified explanation of the abstract
This abstract first appeared for US patent application 20240193264 titled 'FUSE BASED REPLAY PROTECTION WITH AGGRESSIVE FUSE USAGE AND COUNTERMEASURES FOR FUSE VOLTAGE CUT ATTACKS
Simplified Explanation
The patent application describes a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) with programmable fuses in a System on Chip (SoC). The TPM includes an on-die RAM to store a blown-fuse count and a TPM state with a pin-attempt-failure count and a fuse count read from off-die non-volatile memory. During initialization, if the blown-fuse count exceeds the TPM state fuse count, the TPM state pin-attempt-failure count is increased to prevent replay attacks. Access is granted based on a policy where a fuse is blown and the blown-fuse count is incremented. If the fuse blow fails, TPM activity stops. If successful, the TPM state is updated and saved to off-die memory.
- The TPM in an SoC has programmable fuses and an on-die RAM.
- The TPM state includes a pin-attempt-failure count and a fuse count.
- Blown-fuse count is stored in on-die RAM and compared to TPM state fuse count during initialization.
- Access is granted based on a policy where a fuse is blown and the TPM state is updated.
- If the fuse blow fails, TPM activity halts, but if successful, the TPM state is saved to off-die memory.
Potential Applications
This technology can be applied in secure systems requiring protection against replay attacks and unauthorized access. It can be used in IoT devices, smart cards, and other embedded systems where secure authentication is crucial.
Problems Solved
The technology addresses the problem of replay attacks and unauthorized access by implementing a secure authentication mechanism using programmable fuses in the TPM. It ensures that only authorized users can access the system and prevents malicious actors from tampering with the device.
Benefits
- Enhanced security through programmable fuses and secure authentication mechanisms. - Protection against replay attacks and unauthorized access. - Secure storage of sensitive information in the TPM. - Improved trustworthiness of the system by preventing tampering with the device.
Commercial Applications
Title: Secure Authentication Technology with Programmable Fuses for IoT Devices This technology can be commercially applied in IoT devices, smart cards, and other embedded systems that require secure authentication mechanisms. It can be marketed to industries such as cybersecurity, IoT, and smart card manufacturers to enhance the security of their products.
Prior Art
Prior art related to this technology may include patents or research papers on secure authentication mechanisms using programmable fuses in TPMs or SoCs. Researchers can explore existing literature on secure authentication and anti-replay mechanisms in embedded systems to find relevant prior art.
Frequently Updated Research
Researchers in the field of cybersecurity and embedded systems are constantly exploring new methods to enhance the security of IoT devices and embedded systems. Stay updated on the latest research on secure authentication mechanisms and anti-replay attacks to incorporate cutting-edge technologies into your products.
Questions about Secure Authentication Technology with Programmable Fuses
How does the technology prevent replay attacks?
The technology prevents replay attacks by comparing the blown-fuse count to the TPM state fuse count during initialization and incrementing the pin-attempt-failure count if necessary.
What are the potential applications of this technology beyond IoT devices?
The technology can be applied in various industries such as smart cards, automotive security systems, and industrial control systems to enhance security and prevent unauthorized access.
Original Abstract Submitted
a tpm with programmable fuses in an soc includes an on-die ram storing a blown-fuse count and a tpm state including a pin-attempt-failure count and a fuse count, read from off-die nv memory. during initialization, if the blown-fuse count is greater than tpm state fuse count, tpm state pin-attempt-failure count is incremented, thereby thwarting a replay attack. a pin is received for access, and if the tpm state pin-attempt-failure count satisfies a policy, a fuse is blown and the blown-fuse count incremented. if the fuse blow fails, tpm activity is halted. if the fuse blow succeeds and the pin is correct, the tpm state pin-attempt-failure count is cleared, but if the pin is incorrect the tpm state pin-attempt-failure count is incremented. tpm state fuse count is set equal to the blown-fuse count, and the tpm state is saved to off-die nv memory.
